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ORKUN SAKA
Domestic Banks As Lightning Rods? Home Bias
and Information during the Eurozone Crisis
European banks have been criticized for holding excessive domestic gov-
ernment debt during the recent Eurozone crisis, which may have intensified
the diabolic loop between sovereign and bank credit risks. By using a novel
bank-level data set covering the entire timeline of the Eurozone crisis, I first
reconfirm that the crisis led to the reallocation of sovereign debt from for-
eign to domestic banks. In contrast to the recent literature focusing only
on sovereign debt, I show that the banks’ private-sector exposures were (at
least) equally affected by the rise in home bias. Consistent with this pattern,
I propose a new debt reallocation channel based on informational frictions
and show that the informationally closer foreign banks increase their rel-
ative exposures when the sovereign risk rises. The effect of informational
closeness is economically meaningful and robust to the use of different in-
formation measures and controls for alternative channels of sovereign debt
reallocation.
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Can domestic banks act as lightning rods for government
bonds in the midst of a financial storm? On the contrary, by now, the diabolic loop
between sovereign and bank credit risks has been very well documented. Increasing
risk pressures in the banking sector may put an unnecessary burden on public finances
due to potential future bailout costs and negative spillovers to the lending in real
economy. In turn, a spike in the sovereign credit risk might trigger a deterioration in
the banking sector through losses on banks’ government bond holdings and the loss
of credibility for future government support (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl 2014).
Despite this adverse feedback mechanism, the link between governments and
their domestic banks may in fact have a silver lining: local banks generally stand
at a favorable position to have access to soft information regarding their sovereign
clients thanks to their “daily exposure to local news stories, firsthand knowledge
of the local economy, and personal relationships with key people at the issuing
body” (Butler 2008). During market downturns, such informational advantage might
lead them to act as buyers of last resort absorbing the local assets while (poten-
tially uninformed) foreign banks may shed their exposures in panic. Indeed a the-
oretical role for the lack of soft information and the resulting panic by less in-
formed foreign banks are consistent with the evidence that government bond spreads
moved in a self-fulfillingly pessimistic way during the Eurozone crisis and fell
out of touch with the publicly observable hard information regarding the solvency
of individual countries (De Grauwe and Ji 2013, Saka, Fuertes, and Kalotychou
2015).
In this paper, I present evidence for this latter view. I show that when European
banks retreated from the sovereign debt markets of the crisis countries in the Euro-
zone, they did less so for the countries to which they were informationally closer. To
put it in another way, ceteris paribus, a bank whose home country has more informa-
tion regarding a target country increases its relative exposure when the sovereign risk
rises in the target country. This result holds even among the foreign banks and does
not depend on the alternative mechanisms such as the banks’ risk-shifting tendency,
the political strength of their home countries, or the exchange rate/redenomination
risk. Unlike the alternative hypotheses that are specific to the crisis episodes, I show
that information channel is highly active even during the postcrisis period. Further-
more, both direct financial information (measured in bank branches or mergers) and
aggregate information channels (such as common language across countries) seem to
play a role. Hence, I interpret these findings as supportive of the view that informa-
tional asymmetries among banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across
the Eurozone sovereign debt markets.
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the puzzling phenomenon that this paper aims to ad-
dress. Since early 2010, Eurozone banks have lifted up their portion of the do-
mestic sovereign debt, but only in the crisis countries. That is, at the peak of the
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Fig 1. Sovereign Portion of the Domestic Banks in Core and Periphery Euro Countries (2010q1–2015q2).
Note: The graph shows simple country averages of sovereign portion and bond spreads for each country group (core
versus periphery). Sovereign Portion is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by its domestic
banks. Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads for a country (with respect to Germany) over the
3-month period before each observation date. Sovereign bond exposure data come from various stress-tests, transparency,
and recapitalization exercises undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and include 10 observation dates
from 2010-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 1). Bond yields are obtained from Datastream. Core (noncrisis) coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
government debt problems, these banks started accumulating domestic government
bonds. The initial rise and the gradual reversal of this trend—along with the respec-
tive bond spreads—is visible only in periphery part of the Eurozone. In contrast, the
corresponding pattern in the core-Euro countries seems to have been more or less
stable throughout the Eurozone crisis. Intriguingly, the same observation stands in
Figure 2 even after correcting for how much of the domestic debt the banks should
hold in a standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
With the dismal interaction between sovereign and banking crisis in the back-
ground, most of the recent literature attributed this observation to the argument of
financial repression/moral suasion (De Marco and Macchiavelli 2015, Becker and
Ivashina 2018, Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen 2019). In other words, in order to
gain relief from the crisis and to be able to rollover their debt, governments may have
(implicitly) forced the banks in their jurisdiction to increase their domestic sovereign
exposures. Another argument on the repatriation of public debt from the noncrisis to
the crisis countries is based on the assumption that governments would be less willing
to default if their debt was held by the domestic agents rather than the foreign ones
due to the costs such a default would inflict on the domestic economy (Broner, Mar-
tin, and Ventura 2010, Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 2014). Hence, in the existence of
well-functioning secondary markets, sovereign debt should naturally be reallocated
back to the issuing country as the domestic agents there will attach a higher value to
these securities than their foreign counterparts.
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Fig 2. Home Bias of the Domestic Banks in Core and Periphery Euro Countries (2010q1–2015q2).
Note: The graph shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for each country group (core versus
periphery). Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by its domestic banks,
after taking into account the portfolio size of these domestic banks according to a standard portfolio (CAPM) model
(see the Data Description). Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads for a country (with respect to
Germany) over the 3-month period before each observation date. Sovereign bond exposure data come from various stress-
tests, transparency, and recapitalization exercises undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and include 10
observation dates from 2010-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 1). Bond yields are obtained from Datastream. Core
(noncrisis) countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries:
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
With respect to the latter argument, Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of home bias
for different types of creditors in the Eurozone periphery and core countries.1 Though
it is clear from Panel A that the resident banks in the periphery accumulated a big
portion of the domestic sovereign debt, this is hardly true for other nonbank private
residents situated in these very same countries, which goes against the intuition of
Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010) and asks for a further link between the resident
banks and the domestic government debt.
This paper proposes an additional channel on top of the existing ones and argues
that the European banks’ increasing sovereign home bias may be related to one of
the most conventional theories of home bias in the grand literature of international
finance: namely, informational frictions (Brennan and Cao 1997, Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp 2009, Dziuda and Mondria 2012). According to this theory, home bias
prevails in risky asset classes (e.g., equity) when there is an informational advantage
in favor of the domestic agents. In tranquil periods and well-integrated markets such
as the ones in Europe before the Eurozone crisis, one would not expect to observe
1. Bank residents are commercial banks and Other residents are private investors (individual or in-
stitutional; excluding commercial banks), both located in these countries. Nonresidents are all private or
public investors (excluding the European Central Bank [ECB]) located outside these countries.
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Fig 3. Sovereign Portion of Bank Residents, Nonbank Residents, and Nonresidents in Core and Periphery Euro Countries
(2005q1–2015q2).
Note: The graph shows simple country averages of sovereign portion held separately by resident banks, other (nonbank)
residents and nonresidents. Sovereign Portion is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by
a particular creditor group. Sovereign debt exposures come from the data set compiled from various national sources by
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and include quarterly observations from 2005-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2. Core (noncrisis)
countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain. Data for Belgium and Finland can only be found annually; so these data are linearly interpolated in
order to obtain quarterly values.
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a high level of home bias in risk-free debt. Nonetheless, in crisis episodes during
which the government debt gets risky in many countries, it becomes crucial to have
access to soft information regarding the true repayment intentions of the governments
and thus the observed market behavior might deviate from the traditional predictors
such as debt/GDP ratios or growth rates of individual countries. In that case, the less
informed foreign banks may naturally rush to exit these markets in panic, selling most
of their exposures to domestic banks at fire sale prices. Such a market trajectory is
indeed compatible with the evidence in De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Saka, Fuertes,
and Kalotychou (2015) who detect an apparent disconnection between bond spreads
and the publicly available information (i.e., country fundamentals) during the recent
Eurozone crisis.
On one hand, the literature suggests that the banks’ lending behavior is largely in-
fluenced by the proximity to the borrower since more proximate lenders could gain an
edge in gathering soft information about their clients (Petersen and Rajan 2002, De-
gryse and Ongena 2005, Agarwal and Hauswald 2010). If so, this would lead borrow-
ers, especially the relatively small and opaque ones, to borrow more from informa-
tionally closer lenders. On the other hand, it is tempting to think that soft information
should not matter in government debt markets. In tranquil times, when sovereign debt
is considered risk-free, all banks are likely to follow the publicly observable signals
(such as tax revenue or fiscal balance) as indicators for the strength of government’s
ability to pay back its debt. This would lead to a uniform pricing of sovereign bonds
across banks and thus to a low level of home bias.2
Nevertheless, an interesting feature of the government debt markets is that, while
corporate bankruptcy is always about the (in)ability of a company to repay, a
sovereign default is—in most cases—a political decision and directly related to the
degree of the governing party’s willingness to cut back government spending and/or
increase tax rates. This crucial difference between corporate and sovereign debt arises
due to the lack of a legal mechanism to enforce repayment on sovereigns (Panizza,
Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer 2009) and makes it especially important in times
of stress to have insider information on the government’s willingness to honor its
promises or country’s political capacity to endure further budget cuts. In such times,
the increasing noise in perceived country fundamentals may lead to a more heteroge-
neous pricing of sovereign bonds; and thus informationally distant banks may choose
to sell their exposures to local banks who would be receiving a more precise signal
regarding the true default risk of the sovereign and thus be better situated to carry
such exposures in their balance sheets.
Before teasing out the information channel with a novel bank-level data set com-
piled from various stress tests, transparency, and capital exercises of the European
Banking Authority (EBA), I first reconfirm that European banks’ home bias increased
and sovereign debt was indeed reallocated from foreign to domestic banks at the peak
2. Figure 3 is consistent with this prediction as the average portion of sovereign bonds that resident
banks hold in both core and periphery countries is similarly low and around 10–15% prior to the Euro-
zone crisis.
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of the crisis. In addition, I illustrate that, in response to the crisis, private forms of debt
(retail or corporate) in the same bank balance sheets have experienced an equally large
(if not larger) jump in home bias, which tilts the evidence toward a more general ex-
planation of the home bias rather than the specific ones applied only to the sovereign
debt in the recent literature.
Having gained leverage from this preliminary evidence on the potential role of
information during the Eurozone debt crisis, I go on to clearly identify the information
channel in the banks’ sovereign debt holdings. To do this, I focus on the banks’ foreign
country exposures, which helps me minimize the potentially confounding effects of
the alternative theories that are specific to the home country (domestic) exposures,
such as moral suasion or secondary market channels.
Empirically, I take a difference-in-differences (DD) approach by comparing the
sovereign exposures of foreign banks at different levels of informational closeness
with varying levels of sovereign risk for the exposure country. In other words, I es-
timate the interaction between various information proxies (both financial and gen-
eral) and sovereign bond spreads, by saturating the panel model with a rich set of
fixed effects that take into account all the time-varying unobserved factors at bank
and exposure country levels as well as constant bilateral linkages between home and
exposure countries. These two layers of my identification strategy (informational dis-
tance and sovereign risk) assure that I capture the effect of information rather than
some omitted variable as it could be the case in a direct estimation.
As a result, I find strong evidence for the argument that the foreign banks head-
quartered in informationally closer territories increase their relative exposures as the
sovereign risk rises. This effect is robust to controlling for various alternative channels
and changing sample compositions. Interestingly, information seems to matter both
in the forms of financial (i.e., bank branch linkages) and general (i.e., common lan-
guage) knowledge regarding the country of exposure. What is even more interesting
is that the effects are statistically and economically meaningful even after the end of
the Eurozone crisis (mid-2012) and even when very small subsets of the observations
are taken into account to avoid the possible interference of alternative explanations.
It is important to note that information channel could be qualitatively different
for foreign and domestic exposures even though I find quantitatively similar results
with or without domestic banks in my sample. Thus, the identification of information
channel in this paper—mainly—via foreign bank exposures may not automatically
translate into a role for domestic exposures; however it provides very strong sugges-
tive evidence and also implies that the previous literature simply comparing domestic
banks to foreign ones to explain the European banks’ rising home bias may have been
overestimating the role of alternative channels in the absence of explicit controls for
informational heterogeneity across banks.
Sovereign debt crises in a well-integrated monetary union constitutes an ideal set-
ting to isolate the effect of information asymmetry on bank behavior. Avoiding the
cross-country differences in exchange rates, liquidity provision, or collateral require-
ments, this paper presents evidence that information (or the lack thereof) played
a significant role in the recent fragmentation across Eurozone debt markets. Thus,
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revisiting the question in the title of this paper, it is possible that the banks in cri-
sis countries have partly acted as lightning rods collecting the domestic sovereign
debt while the less informed foreign banks left the market in panic, triggering a fi-
nancial storm. Despite the so-called doom loop between the two, the relationship of
the European banks with their local governments may have an underexplored silver
lining.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly outlines the rele-
vant background literature. Section 2 describes the data. The empirical methodology
and the results are presented in Section 3. Final section concludes the paper.
1. THE RELATED LITERATURE
1.1 Recent Home Bias in the Eurozone
The main motivation of the paper comes from the recently aroused interest in aca-
demic and policy circles on the causes of the rising fragmentation—“home bias”—
across Eurozone sovereign debt markets. One of the earlier contributions by Becker
and Ivashina (2018) illustrates the positive association between country-level gov-
ernment ownership in the banking sector and domestic government bond holdings of
the banks. They further extend this finding by showing that the crisis-country banks
with a higher number of government-affiliated boardmembers holdmore government
bonds in their balance sheets. Using a proprietary bank-level data set from the ECB,
Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen (2019) demonstrate that, compared to the foreign
ones, domestic banks located in the crisis countries were more inclined to increase
their exposures when the local governments had to rollover large chunks of outstand-
ing public debt. Many other recent papers confirm these observations and conclude
that a moral suasion channel was in operation during the Eurozone crisis (De Marco
and Macchiavelli 2015, Horváth, Huizinga, and Ioannidou 2015, Altavilla, Pagano,
and Simonelli 2017).
Nonetheless, these studies are not always able to rule out the possible informa-
tion channel that might be active between governments and the related (domestic
or public) banks.3 By constructing an identification strategy based on the informa-
tional heterogeneity across foreign banks and thus minimizing the moral suasion
concerns, I contribute to this literature and illustrate that the information channel can
be a key determinant in explaining the recent sovereign debt reallocation across the
European banks.
Another strand in the home bias literature specific to sovereign debt underlines the
assumption that it is harder for governments to default when their debt is held domes-
tically. In such a scenario, government would rather choose not to default since the
benefits could be offset by its harm on the domestic economy. Hence, in expectation
3. “... banks could voluntarily acquire local sovereign debt in a fire sale context due to a local infor-
mation advantage.” and “... strictly speaking, we do not rule out the “fire sale” explanation in this paper”
(Becker and Ivashina 2018, pp. 4–5)
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of this conjecture by the local agents, government debt will flow back to the issuing
country during times of rising sovereign stress (Broner, Martin, and Ventura 2010).
In a recent paper, Brutti and Sauré (2016) present confirming evidence in the con-
text of the Eurozone crisis by demonstrating that the debt of the crisis-governments
flew toward those banks whose home countries were politically more powerful in the
Euro area, implying that the debt reallocation was mainly driven to discourage the
troubled governments from declaring bankruptcy. Therefore, while identifying the
information channel in this paper, I control for the political strength of the banks’
home countries and show that the inclusion of such controls does not challenge my
results.
A related literature focuses on the risk-shifting tendency of the undercapitalized
banks. According to this argument, the banks with low capital ratios prefer high-risk
instruments such as the government bonds of the crisis countries so that the share-
holders would asymmetrically benefit from a resurrection of the country while their
losses would be limited in case of a default. (Acharya and Steffen 2015, Horváth,
Huizinga, and Ioannidou 2015). As shown by Crosignani (2015), such weak banks
are more likely to exist in the crisis countries. As a result, in the estimations of infor-
mation channel, I control for the risk-shifting incentives of the banks headquartered
in the distressed countries and again show that the inclusion of such controls does not
qualitatively change any of the main results.
1.2 Home Bias in Other Markets
There are many studies exploring the home bias in portfolio holdings of dif-
ferent asset classes. The literature mainly focuses on equity holdings (French and
Poterba 1991) whereas a few others investigate the regional biases in international
bond portfolios (Lane 2005). Most of this previous work revolves around three
broad categorical explanations for home bias: exchange rate risk, transaction costs,
and informational frictions (Coeurdacier and Rey 2013). In the specific context of
Europe, with the increasing financial integration and exchange rate stability over
the years, it is reasonable to argue that a more realistic culprit for the recently
sky-rocketing home bias across various asset classes could be the informational
asymmetries.
In a seminal paper, Brennan and Cao (1997) model the sensitivity to asset-related
news when there is a difference between informational endowments of domestic and
foreign agents. They illustrate that, in such a scenario, home bias would be positively
associated with the negative news as foreign investors would try to infer the local
information from past asset prices. On a similar path, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-
kamp (2009) show that, in the existence of (initially small) informational differences,
costly information acquisition process may boost the agents’ home bias. Finally, Dz-
iuda and Mondria (2012) demonstrate that, even with sophisticated investors such as
investment funds, home bias may arise due to the fact that investors would be better
at judging the performance of fund managers when they invest in local assets rather
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than in foreign ones. Therefore, one might observe home bias even in the portfolios
of highly sophisticated institutions such as banks or mutual funds.4
Following the intuition that the informational frictions might lie behind the widely
observed home bias in various asset classes, researchers have empirically studied the
effects of several forms of informational distance on portfolio holdings. For instance,
Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) find that geographical proximity is crucial for
U.S. investors’ portfolio composition and the risk-adjusted returns, even within the
same country. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) discover that investors might be biased
toward such firms that are close to them not only in terms of physical location; but
also in terms of culture and language of communication. Hau (2001) exemplifies a
case in which professional traders located in Germany or in German-speaking cities
make more profit in German stocks. In a cross-country study, more closely related
to the paper at hand, Portes and Rey (2005) conclude that the geographical distance
matters for cross-border capital flows; however it mostly proxies the effects of other
informational variables such as bank branches across countries or telephone call traf-
fic. I borrow the empirical measures of informational distance (such as bank branches,
common language, or press coverage) from this literature and complement it by ex-
tending the evidence to the context of commercial banks’ government bond holdings.
2. DATA DESCRIPTION
The main body of the data used in the paper come from various stress tests, trans-
parency, and recapitalization exercises that are undertaken by the EBA over the course
of 5 years for a large set of European banks covering 30 members of the European
Economic Area (EEA). Table 1 lists these exercises and the disclosure dates for each
one of them together with how many banks and which information dates were cov-
ered. Ten data time-points start from the first quarter of 2010 and goes all the way to
the second quarter of 2015, thus covering the start, rise, and fall of the Eurozone cri-
sis. Sovereign bond holdings are reported for each data time-point while private credit
exposures (corporate, retail, etc.) can be found for six of these. In each disclosure, the
full country-breakdown of each bank’s debt portfolio for up to 200 countries can be
found. However, to focus on the debt reallocation across Europe, only the exposures
to 30 EEA countries are included in the sample.
The main banks involved in the exercises mostly stay the same even though some
smaller banks are added and dropped from one exercise to another. All exposures are
consolidated at the parent bank level and each exercise involves at least 65% of the
total banking assets in Europe and 50% of the banking sector in each EEA mem-
ber. Compared to other studies using proprietary data sets from the ECB (Altavilla,
Pagano, and Simonelli 2017, Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen 2019), the EBA data
4. For evidence on the informational advantage that domestic investors may hold vis-à-vis foreign
investors, see, among many others, Kang and Stulz (1997), Kim and Wei (2002), and Kaufmann, Mehrez,
and Schmukler (2005).
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TABLE 1
Data Disclosure Details from the European Banking Authority (EBA)









15/07/2011 2011 EU-wide stress
testing exercise (EBA)
2010-Q4 90 Sovereign &
Private
08/12/2011 EU Capital exercise 2011
(EBA)
2011-Q3 65 Sovereign












26/10/2014 2014 EU-wide stress
testing exercise (EBA)









Note: The table lists the disclosures of various exercise results as announced by the EBA. CEBS refers to the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, which was comprised of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks of the European Union and later
succeeded by the EBA. 2010 EU-wide stress testing exercise was conducted by the CEBS and made public by national regulators; however the
EBA does not provide the related data. Hence, this data set was obtained from the Peterson Institute for International Economics while all other
data sets were acquired from the EBA. Private credit refers to the corporate and retail credit exposure of the banks covered in the respective
data sets. Information date refers to the data time-points in each disclosure for which the values of bank credit positions can be found.
cover banks from a wider range of countries (including non-Eurozone) and docu-
ments a finer granularity in terms of full country-breakdowns of sovereign exposures
at the bank level.
I am mainly interested in what portion of a sovereign’s total debt is held by a spe-
cific bank. Thus, the main variable of interest (SovereignPortionb,c,t ) measures each
bank’s (b) nominal exposure to a certain country (c) at a certain time-point (t) divided





It is important to note that this measure is independent of the valuation technique
used for the bank-level sovereign exposures as long as all the banks apply the same
methodology at a given point in time, which is the case inmy sample as all disclosures
are centrally directed and homogenized by the EBA. This helps me better quantify
the relative distribution of sovereign debt across banks. Furthermore, by construction,
SovereignPortionb,c,t does not depend on the price changes as these are automatically
reflected in all banks’ nominal exposures and thus does not change the particular
portion that a specific bank holds out of the total debt. Therefore, it also constitutes
an ideal measure to understand the reallocation of sovereign debt over time.
In line with the mainstream literature on home bias (Ahearne, Griever, and
Warnock 2004, Coeurdacier and Rey 2013), I also create an alternative variable that
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takes into account the optimal portion of sovereign debt that should be held by a
bank according to a standard CAPM. This variable (SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t ) takes
the difference between our main variable of interest (SovereignPortionb,c,t ) and the
portion that is suggested by the CAPM (SovereignPortionCAPMb,t ).5 As conventional
in the literature, this difference is standardized by the share of other banks’ portfolios
in the global portfolio (1 − SovereignPortionCAPMb,t ). That is,
SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t = SovereignPortionb,c,t − SovereignPortionCAPMb,t










If bias variable (SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t ) takes the value of 1, it means all of
the country’s debt is held by the specific bank, thus perfect bias. If it is zero, that
means the bank holds exactly the portion of the debt suggested by the CAPM model,
thus no bias. In addition, I create the corresponding variable for retail exposures
(RetailPortionb,c,t ) exactly in the same way as described above, but this time with
the banks’ nominal exposures to the retail sector.6
For the first part of my analysis on how home bias changes during the Eurozone
crisis, I construct a dummy variable (Crisisc,t) by using the daily yields of 10-year
maturity bonds of 30 European countries that are obtained fromDatastream.7 I follow
a similar approach to Brutti and Sauré (2016) and categorize a country as “in crisis”
(Crisisc,t = 1) if a country is a Euro member and the average of its daily bond spreads
(with respect to Germany) for the previous 3 months was above 400 basis points.8
As a last step, in order to quantify the informational linkages across countries, I
construct eight proxies in line with the previous literature (Portes, Rey, and Oh 2001,
Portes and Rey 2005, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009). These variables are likely
to absorb the varying as well as the overlapping aspects of the bilateral information
sets available to each bank in my sample.
First one, Branchesl,c, represents the total number of bank branches in the expo-
sure country of the bank which ultimately belong to a parent bank located in its home
5. Notice that, in an ideal CAPM world, the optimal portion that a bank would hold in equilibrium for
any country of exposure should depend only on the size of the bank’s sovereign portfolio and the size of
the global sovereign portfolio, meaning that it does not depend on the specific country of exposure (c).
6. According to the definition in the EBA’s Interactive Single Rulebook, retail exposures are generally
composed of loans to individuals (such as consumer credit or mortgages) and small business loans not
exceeding 1 million Euros.
7. Bond yields for two countries (Estonia and Liechtenstein) are not available on Datastream; so these
observations are dropped from the sample.
8. Robustness checks with the thresholds of 300 or 500bps, reported in an earlier version of this paper
(see Saka 2018), do not lead to any meaningful change in my estimations.
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country.9 This proxy aims to capture the intensity of the financial information ex-
change between the two countries, which probably makes it the most relevant infor-
mation proxy for the banks in my sample. Unfortunately, however, branch informa-
tion cannot be derived historically and SNL Financial only provides the most recent
data available (as of February 2016). Despite the possibility that the Eurozone crisis
itself may have changed the ownership network of bank branches across European
countries, it is difficult to say toward which direction this kind of a bias would drive
my estimates.
Nevertheless, to overcome the potential endogeneity concerns, I propose another
proxy for the flow of financial information across countries, which—to the best of
my knowledge—has not been used in this context before. This alternative variable,
Mergersl,c, is derived from the SDC Platinum and measures the total number of bank
mergers that occurred between the home country and the exposure country in the
years starting from 1985 all the way up to the precrisis year of 2008 in Europe. The
downside of focusing on bank mergers is obviously the risk of underestimating other
potential channels via which financial institutions may set up branches in foreign
countries, such as greenfield investments. The identifying assumption here is that the
method of foreign bank entry does not meaningfully differ across European countries,
or is at least orthogonal to the sovereign risk.
For a more general information variable that is not specific to the financial exper-
tise but can point out the overall familiarity between the citizens of different countries
in my sample, I follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) and search the head-
lines of all news articles covered inside each country’s highest circulated newspaper
in Factiva for the years between 2003 and 2007.10 Specifically, in order to construct
the Pressl,c variable, I record the frequency of each country or its citizens being men-
tioned in another country’s newspaper headline and divide it by the total number of
times in which the country or its citizens are mentioned in any newspaper in my
sample. This simple index summarizes the relative familiarity of a country and its
citizens to other countries. Still, it should be taken with a grain of salt; because news-
papers are not neutral information transmitters and possibly biased toward covering
negative/dramatic events that are likely to exaggerate the previously held stereotypes
(Hamilton 2004).
In addition to the proxies above, the literature suggests a few structural variables
that may capture linguistic, historical, and geographical roots of information trans-
mission. One of the most important of these is to share a common language which
9. This variable is created by taking all of the ultimate-parent banks located in 30 EEA countries
available in SNL database, independent of whether the bank is included in EBA data set or not. The purpose
here is to capture the nontime-varying banking linkages across countries. Hence, it is important to consider
the full sample available rather than only the restricted EBA sample (though results do not depend on this
sample choice). This data cover 137,284 bank branches in total which is 92%of all bank branches (149,242)
in these countries, estimated using World Bank data for 2014 (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.
CBK.BRCH.P5).
10. For Cyprus and Malta, there is no precrisis press coverage in Factiva. Thus, I use the most recently
available coverage for the period furthest away in time from the Eurozone crisis, between the years 2016
and 2018.
286 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
has been consistently shown to have a substantial positive impact on investors’ asset
holdings (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001, Hau 2001). Accordingly, I employ a vari-
able, Languagel,c, which takes the value of 1 if at least 9% of the population in both
countries speaks the same language and 0 otherwise.
Another indicator that may absorb the common cultural and historical heritage
across different nations which may make them more familiar with each other is their
colonial ties,Colonyl,c, which is again a dummy variable picking up the pairs of coun-
tries that have ever had a colonial relationship in the past.
In terms of geographical proximity, which may ease the flow of information be-
tween two countries, I resort to the following two variables: Distancel,c, the log dis-
tance in kilometers between the capital city of the bank’s home country (l) and the
capital city of the exposure country (c);11 and Borderl,c, which is a dummy for pairs
of countries sharing a common border. Note that these two geographical variables are
usually treated as biased proxies as they may inversely pick up investors’ diversifi-
cation incentives to hold less correlated and thus more distant assets in which case
the same proxies may correlate in the opposite direction with the banks’ govern-
ment bond holdings. All of these structural variables come from Mayer and Zignago
(2011), except the measure of geographical distance which is derived via MapQuest.
On top of the more standard information measures described so far, I also include a
dummy for the shared legal origins across countries (Legall,c) derived from La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). Given the large literature on the exogenous
introduction of legal traditions and how they may later lead to heterogeneous out-
comes in economic rules and regulations, one could argue that the commonality of
legal systems may serve as an informational tool for investors. Accordingly, it might
be easier for the banks in my sample to invest in a foreign country with a similar legal
system to that of their own country simply because they would face less uncertainty
regarding financial rules and regulations. Keep in mind that the common legal ori-
gins are also likely to be highly correlated with the cultural traditions that may not
have much to do with the exchange of actual information between countries (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2009).
Table 2 gives summary statistics for these variables. It is important to note that
for SovereignPortion variable, more than half of the observations contain zero val-
ues. However, these are meaningful zeros, implying that the bank does not have any
exposure to that sovereign at that certain point in time. When the mean levels across
general and domestic samples are compared, one can clearly see the inclination of the
banks to hold a higher fraction of the government debt of their own countries. The
same can also be said for retail debt (RetailPortion). When we compare different debt
categories for domestic bank samples, we see that a bank on average holds a higher
fraction of its country’s retail debt (16.44%) than it holds its country’s sovereign
debt (12.56%). This observation is consistent with the information asymmetry view
11. Specifically, this variable is defined as log(xl,c + 1) and naturally takes the value of zero for do-
mestic observations (l = c). I have also experimented with various distance measures from Mayer and
Zignago (2011) that take into account countries’ intranational distances consistent with the international
ones. None of them lead to any significant change in my results.
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for the Main Variables
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Min Max Observations Source
SovereignPortion (in bps) 120 0 466 0 9,725 23,268 EBA
SovereignPortionBias (in
bps)
−1 −37 468 −755 9,720 23,268 EBA
RetailPortion (in bps) 121 0 688 0 10,000 13,509 EBA
SovereignPortion
(Domestic in bps)
1,256 919 1,281 0 8,407 831 EBA
SovereignPortionBias
(Domestic in bps)
1,150 720 1,279 −137 8,405 831 EBA
RetailPortion (Domestic
in bps)
1,644 753 2,078 0 10,000 497 EBA
Bond Spreads (in bps) 254 144 335 −96 2,883 280 Datastream
Crisis dummy (Spread >
400bps)
0.12 0 0.33 0 1 280 Datastream
Branches 220 0 1864 0 28,718 616 SNL Financial
Mergers 5 0 34 0 610 616 SDC Platinum
Press 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.95 616 Factiva
Language 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 616 Mayer and
Zignago (2011)
Colony 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 616 Mayer and
Zignago (2011)
Distance 6.90 7.22 1.47 0.00 8.49 616 MapQuest
Border 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 616 Mayer and
Zignago (2011)
Legal 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 616 La Porta et al.
(2008)
Note: The table lists the variables used in the main regressions. “Bps” denotes basis points. SovereignPortion is the portion of the total
sovereign debt of a country held by a specific bank. SovereignPortionBias is the portion of total sovereign debt of a country held by a specific
bank, after adjusting for a standard CAPM model (see the Data Description section). RetailPortion is the portion of the total retail debt in a
country held by a specific bank. Domestic in parentheses denotes the observations where the country of exposure is the same as the home
country of the bank. Bond Spreads are the spreads (in basis points) on 10-year maturity bond for each country in the sample (with respect to
10-year German bond) averaged over 3-month daily values before each observation date. Crisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
a Euro country’s 3-month average bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points at an observation date. For the specific
definitions of information proxies (Branches-Legal), see the Data Description section. The last column shows the data sources.
of home bias, predicting that—in general—informationally more opaque assets (i.e.,
private debt) should suffer more from home bias than other more standardized assets
(i.e., public debt) would do.
3. METHODOLOGY & RESULTS
3.1 Home Bias during the Eurozone Crisis
3.1.1 Analysis. Before I lay out my main analysis and show how the information
channel—in interaction with sovereign risk—may affect government bond markets,
I investigate the effect of the Eurozone crisis separately on European banks sovereign
and retail debt home biases. For this purpose, I employ a simple difference-in-
differences (DD) methodology, which assumes that the banks’ home bias in crisis
and noncrisis countries should share a parallel trend in the time period preceding
the Eurozone crisis. A simple visual check on Panel A of Figure 3 confirms the fact
that the sovereign portion held by the resident banks in core and periphery countries
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moved in tandem with each other prior to the Eurozone crisis, which provides as-
surance regarding the validity of this assumption. Therefore, I go on to estimate the
following model:
Portionl,b,c,t = β1(Crisisc,t × Domesticl,c) + β0Domesticl,c + θb,t
+ γc,t + εl,b,c,t, (1)
where (l) denotes the home country of the bank, (b) identifies the specific bank, (c)
is for the country of exposure, and (t) specifies the time dimension. All variables
are constructed as previously explained in the Data Description section. Controls in-
clude a broad set of fixed effects at the levels of Bank*Time (θb,t) and ExposureCoun-
try*Time (γc,t). Thus, the model controls for the overall effects of the crisis or any
other time-varying factor both at the home country (since banks never change their
home country) and exposure country levels and Crisis dummy can only enter the re-
gression in an interaction term. In addition,Domesticl,c is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are located in the country of exposure (i.e., l =
c). In this model, β0 should give us an idea about the general level and significance of
the home bias in the European banks’ balance sheets and β1 measures the additional
effect of the Eurozone crisis on this home bias. Same model is also estimated for the
alternative dependent variable with CAPM adjustment (PortionBiasl,b,c,t).
Results with SovereignPortionb,c,t and SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t as the dependent
variables are presented in Table 3. Columns I–II and V–VI confirm the previous liter-
ature that banks do have home bias in their sovereign debt holdings. It is economically
meaningful as well at a level around 12.6%. Given that average sovereign holding in
our sample is around 1.2%, this finding clearly illustrates that a bank holds a much
bigger portion of a country’s debt when it comes to its own country. Columns III–IV
and VII–VIII of the same table ratifies another observation that is consistent with the
previous literature: the sovereign home bias increases during times of crisis (Brutti
and Sauré 2016, Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi 2018). The effect is economically huge:
the portion of a country’s debt held by a representative domestic bank almost doubles
in response to crisis. Hence, this finding establishes the link between a sovereign debt
crisis and the absorption of government bonds by the domestic banks.
One could further investigate to find out where the treatment effect in Table 3 comes
from. Since this is technically a diff-in-diff setting, the estimated effect could be due
to the possibility that domestic banks are increasing their SovereignPortion during
the crisis or foreign banks are decreasing theirs or these two patterns could be occur-
ring simultaneously. Indeed, in Figure 3, one could visually compare the behavior of
resident—that is, domestic—banks (Panel A) and nonresident investors—including
the foreign banks—(Panel B) and conclude that these two patterns might be occur-
ring at the same time. To formalize this observation, I estimate the effect of the cri-
sis separately on domestic and foreign bank samples; but this time using a simpler
specification as the Crisis variable only changes across exposure countries and time.
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TABLE 3




I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Domestic 1,257*** 1,257*** 1,127*** 1,126*** 1,273*** 1,273*** 1,143*** 1,143**
[10.430] [10.276] [9.363] [9.210] [10.511] [10.356] [9.437] [9.284]
Domestic ×
Crisis
1,093*** 1,102*** 1,095*** 1,101**
[3.755] [3.680] [3.753] [3.670]
Fixed Effects
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
ExpCountry ×
Time
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Adj-R2 0.244 0.236 0.264 0.256 0.243 0.229 0.262 0.249
N 23,268 23,268 23,268 23,268 23,268 23,268 23,268 23,268
Note: The table summarizes the results of the equation (1) with dependent variables SovereignPortion (I–IV) and SovereignPortionBias (V–
VIII) estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. SovereignPortion is
the portion of total sovereign debt of a country held by a specific bank. SovereignPortionBias is the portion of total sovereign debt of a country
held by a specific bank, after adjusting for a standard CAPM model (see the Data Description section). Domestic is a dummy variable equal
to 1 only if the country of exposure is the same as the home country of the bank. Crisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro
country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month
period preceding the observation date. Sovereign bond holding data come from various exercises of the European Banking Authority (EBA)
and country exposures are included for 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields for Crisis dummy are obtained from
Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level and t-statistics are reported in brackets. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
Results reported in Table A1 of the Online Appendix confirm the previous intuition
that these two patterns occur at the same time.
Recent literature has mainly focused on the rise in European banks’ home bias in
government bonds although this behavior might also be a subobservation of a more
general phenomenon, such as informational frictions that may simultaneously affect
multiple asset classes. Thus, I would like to compare the effect of the crisis on home
bias in other—and potentially less transparent—asset classes held by the same banks,
focusing first on the retail debt generally owed by individuals and small businesses.
For this purpose, I employ the same specification as in equation (1) but this time with
the dependent variable as RetailPortionb,c,t .
Columns I–II and V–VI in Table 4 confirm that there is a significant home bias in
retail debt, indeed larger than the one in sovereign debt. The magnitude of general
home bias for retail debt (16.84%) is more than 30% higher than the one for sovereign
debt (12.57%; see Columns I–II in Table 3), which is in line with the notion that the
informationally more sensitive assets such as retail debt should be held in general
more intensively by the domestic agents who have an advantage in reaching out the
relevant information for such assets (Portes, Rey, and Oh 2001, Portes and Rey 2005).
The comparison of the remaining columns in Tables 3 and 4 provide even more
interesting results. Columns III–IV and VII–VIII show that the Eurozone crisis has a
positively significant effect on the home bias in retail debt. However, the size of this
effect is larger than the one estimated for sovereign debt in Table 3, meaning that it is
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TABLE 4




I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Domestic 1,684*** 1,684*** 1,544*** 1,542*** 1,713*** 1,713*** 1,573*** 1,569**
[8.267] [8.158] [7.546] [7.436] [8.326] [8.216] [7.617] [7.499]
Domestic ×
Crisis
1,299** 1,316** 1,297** 1,333**
[2.582] [2.557] [2.554] [2.545]
Fixed Effects
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
ExpCountry ×
Time
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Adj.R2 0.198 0.185 0.210 0.197 0.196 0.189 0.207 0.201
N 13,509 13,509 13,509 13,509 13,509 13,509 13,509 13,509
Note: The table summarizes the results of the equation (1) with dependent variables RetailPortion (I–IV) and RetailPortionBias (V–VIII)
estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. RetailPortion is the portion
of total retail debt of a country held by a specific bank. RetailPortionBias is the portion of total retail debt of a country held by a specific bank,
after adjusting for a standard CAPM model (see the Data Description section). Domestic is a dummy variable equal to 1 only if the country
of exposure is the same as the home country of the bank. Crisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread
(with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding the
observation date. Data on retail exposures come from various exercises of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and country exposures
are included for 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields for Crisis dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the bank level and t-statistics are reported in brackets. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
the retail debt that may have suffered more intensely from the rise in home bias dur-
ing the Eurozone crisis. It is important to remind here that the Crisis variable is con-
structed using a sovereign risk metric (i.e., government bond spreads), which makes
it a noisier proxy to represent the true credit risk of the retail debt unless sovereign
and private-sector credit risks are perfectly correlated within the same country. Such
measurement error could possibly lead to attenuation bias, underestimating the true
effect of the crisis on domestic retail debt holdings.12
3.1.2 Robustness checks. All the results related to this subsection can be found in
the Online Appendix. As a first robustness check, equation (1) is estimated with an-
other form of private debt (namely, corporate debt from the same EBA disclosures) in
Table A2. Not surprisingly, results are very much in line: in general, European banks
have a higher home bias in their corporate exposures and, compared to sovereign
debt, this bias rises at least equally in response to a crisis in a country.13
12. The difference between unobserved retail sector credit risk and observed sovereign credit risk is
likely to be larger during the Eurozone crisis, which would lead to a correlation between the measurement
error andmy observed proxy for credit risk (Crisisc,t ). This can cause a classical errors-in-variables problem
that may underestimate the effect of the crisis on domestic retail debt (see Roberts and Whited 2013). In
simple terms, the assumption that the private sector should be in crisis every time the government is in
trouble would lead us to underestimate the effect of the crisis on private debt. This is clearly because the
private sector may not be in trouble in some of those periods when the government is.
13. In another unreported robustness check, I repeat the analysis by only including the EBA disclosure
dates in which both types of debt exposures were disclosed (six dates; see Table 1) and find that results
are unchanged.
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One concern regarding the construction of the dependent variable could be the pos-
sibility that SovereignPortion (or RetailPortion) for a specific bank can change inde-
pendently of a change in its absolute (nominal) exposures since the relative holdings
of other banks in the sample have an influence on the portion of debt that a specific
bank holds, which may lead to an overestimation of the differences in a diff-in-diff
setting. On the other hand, the advantage of using the Portion as the main dependent
variable is to capture the relative shares of each bank holding a specific country’s
total debt portfolio, which not only standardizes the nominal exposures and eases
the interpretation but also makes sure that the dependent variable does not change
with the price changes in the underlying debt. Thus, I reestimate equation (1) by
log-linearizing the nominal exposures of each bank (in million Euros). The results
reported in Tables A3 and A4 are in line with the previous findings and alleviate
the concerns that the Portion variable might lead to an overestimation of the home
bias phenomenon.
Finally, I reestimate equation (1) for sovereign and retail debt by clustering the
standard errors at different levels. Although the previous literature has the convention
of clustering at the bank level (see Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli 2017, Ongena,
Popov, and Van Horen 2019), it is possible that the error structure is correlated across
banks in the same country or in the same disclosure exercise. Thus, I experiment
with three different clustering schemes at the home country (22 clusters), time (10
clusters), and home country× time (207 clusters) levels. As expected, standard errors
(t-values) get larger (smaller) when they are clustered at a more aggregate level such
as home country in which the banks are fully nested (see Tables A5 and A6). On
the other hand, when clustered only by time, std. errors decrease as the potential
correlation of observations within the same bank across different disclosure dates is
ignored (see Tables A7 and A8). Finally, std. errors are the smallest when clustered at
the country × time level, in which the observations across a large number of clusters
are assumed to be uncorrelated (see Tables A9 and A10). In each of these settings,
all the estimated coefficients stay at the conventional levels of statistical significance.
To sum up, the robust findings documented in this section are consistent with the
expectation that, during the crisis episodes that are usually associated with the rising
informational frictions, most asset types are likely to experience a reallocation from
foreign to domestic agents. Overall, the preliminary evidence implies that the recent
sovereign debt reallocation in Europe was not a special case and could have been
partly caused by a more general phenomenon that may have influenced various asset
classes simultaneously.
3.2 Effect of Informational Closeness on Banks’ Sovereign Exposures
3.2.1 Identification strategy. My identification strategy to tease out the information
channel builds on two layers. First, I argue that the informational closeness matters
for the banks’ asset holdings in general. It is already well established in the litera-
ture that the proximity to the borrower matters for the banks’ lending behavior and
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it determines the amount of soft information that the bank could gather to serve its
customers.14 In the context of government debt, such soft information could be ob-
tained via domestic banks’ local/political connections or simply by operating within
the country and being more familiar with its daily news and economic as well as
political climate. To this end, I employ eight carefully constructed measures of infor-
mational closeness, some of which are commonly used in cross-country studies (see
Data Description).
Directly checking the effects of these proxies on government bond holdings may
not be suitable as there exists the risk of picking up unobserved country/bank-specific
characteristics or, more importantly, other types of bilateral cross-country linkages
that may not have anything to do with information. This weakness calls for the second
layer of my identification strategy where I benefit from the theoretical prediction that
the information channel should be stronger for riskier assets (Portes, Rey, and Oh
2001).
Why would information become more relevant with increasing tensions in
sovereign debt markets? Though they are usually transparent and standardized, these
markets also have an interesting aspect: while corporate bankruptcy is always about
the (in)ability of a company to repay, a sovereign default is—in most cases—a polit-
ical decision and directly related to the willingness of the political actors to cut back
government spending or increase tax rates. This crucial difference between corporate
and sovereign debt arises due to the lack of a legal mechanism to enforce repayment
on sovereigns (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer 2009) and makes it especially
important in times of heightened sovereign risk to have in-advance information on
government’s willingness to honor its promises or country’s political capacity to en-
dure further budget cuts. For example, Butler (2008) illustrates a case in which local
investment banks underwriting municipal bonds have comparative advantage in ac-
cessing and assessing soft information, especially when the bond is risky. Hence, I
expect the effect of information channel to intensify at higher levels of default risk
for the government.
Thanks to these two layers, I can employ a DD model in which I estimate the in-
teraction of information proxies with a measure of sovereign risk as in the following:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β1(SovereignRiskc,t × In f ormationl,c)
+ θb,t + γc,t + μl,c + εl,b,c,t, (2)
where In f ormationl,c stands for one of the eight proxies of informational closeness
of the banks toward other countries as well as toward their own and SovereignRiskc,t
is the average of the past 3 months’ daily bond spreads with respect to Germany.
Equation (2) has the spirit of the gravity regressions in the trade literature (e.g., An-
derson and van Wincoop 2003) and I am able to saturate the model with a full set of
14. See, among many others, Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Mian (2006),
Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009), and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010).
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fixed effects, especially including dummies at the level of interaction between home
country and exposure country (μl,c) so that all time-invariant bilateral cross-country
linkages could be directly controlled. This aspect is very crucial for my identification
strategy and restricts the model to only use the time variation available in sovereign
risk to be able to identify the information channel. That is, the interaction of cross-
sectional variation in sovereign risk and informational proxies is automatically cap-
tured byμl,c and if there is not enough time variation in bond spreads, the inclusion of
these dummies would bias my β1 estimates downward. For example, if British banks
typically hold high levels of Cypriot government debt due to their informational ad-
vantage in Cyprus, I can capture this only if there is enough variation over time in the
Cypriot government bond spreads; otherwise such pair-specific relationships will all
be subsumed by μl,c.15
Specifications in the previous section concentrated on the rising home bias phe-
nomenon that was related specifically to the domestic observations in my sample,
such as Greek banks’ exposures to Greek government debt. In order to avoid the
complications raised by the home bias phenomenon and its confounding channels
(such as moral suasion or secondary markets), I take a rather extreme approach and
drop all the domestic observations from the full sample and report a second set of
results only with the banks’ remaining exposures to foreign countries. Notice that
this is a conservative way of identifying the role of information on banks’ govern-
ment bond holdings since such a channel, if it exists, would probably be strongest
between governments and domestic banks. By dropping these domestic observations
and comparing the informational closeness only across foreign banks, I would poten-
tially be underestimating the true magnitude of the information channel in exchange
for providing a cleaner identification.16
It is theoretically possible that the information channel may be qualitatively dif-
ferent for foreign and domestic exposures. The way I identify the causal impact of
information on sovereign exposures is mainly by abstaining from the comparisons
that include domestic exposures—which may lead to spurious correlations due to
alternative channels as mentioned above—and by only comparing one foreign expo-
sure to another. Hence, I essentially estimate the local treatment effect of information
on banks’ foreign exposures, which is not necessarily the same thing as the local
treatment effect on domestic exposures.
However, given that I use the same set of banks in my analysis (with or without
their domestic exposures), it seems reasonable to assume that the banks that use in-
formation to rebalance their foreign government bond holdings would similarly use
the information that they have regarding their domestic bond holdings. Thus, I do
15. In line with this argument,Crisis variable (instead of SovereignRisk) was used in a previous version
of this paper (see Saka 2018), producing similar but less statistically significant estimates and supporting
the argument that the information channel is broader than being specific to crisis episodes.
16. I thank a referee for pointing out that some foreign banks may also act as market-makers in
sovereign debt markets and thus might have aggregate information on investors’ demand. Since the aim
of this paper is to focus on the role of country-specific information that the foreign banks hold, the inves-
tigation of this complementary market-making channel lies beyond our scope.
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not expect the two local treatment effects to vastly differ, which is confirmed by the
similarity of the coefficient estimates in the samples with or without home country
exposures. This implies that, even though I do not directly estimate the effect of in-
formation on home bias, my results suggest a major role to have been played by infor-
mation in the European banks’ rising home bias documented in the previous section.
A further implication is that the previous literature on this topic may have suffered
from an omitted variable bias in the absence of explicit controls for informational
heterogeneity across banks.
Finally, I estimate the effect of each information proxy first in separate regressions
and then altogether in the same regression in order to see which ones aremore relevant
in this specific context. Even though such analysis must be taken with a grain of salt
since most of these variables are highly correlated with each other (see Table B1),
this could help identify the relative strengths and biases of each of these proxies.
3.2.2 Results. Table 5 presents the effects of informational distance on banks’ gov-
ernment bond exposures conditional on the level of sovereign spreads. For easy com-
parison, estimations with two different samples (all versus foreign) and specifications
(single versus full) are reported side by side. A point worth mentioning initially is
that, compared to the previous estimations, the explanatory power (adjustedR2) of the
model with full sample massively increases due to the fixed effects at HomeCountry
× ExposureCountry level, implying that cross-country linkages matter substantially
for the European banks’ sovereign portfolios. In “single variable” estimations with
the full sample (Column I), interaction coefficients for all proxies are statistically
significant at 1% level in the expected directions, being negative for geographical
distance and positive for the rest. In the sample of foreign exposures (after the do-
mestic ones are dropped; see Column III), corresponding proxies retain a high level
of significance except the legal origins proxy, which is not surprising given the noisy
nature of that variable as it is likely to capture other cultural and historical trends than
pure informational distance (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009, p. 1106).
Most relevant proxies in this context are the ones measuring financial information
transmission via current bank branches or historical bank mergers. The estimate in
Column I implies that, for the country with median sovereign bond spreads in my
sample (144bps), a change in branches from 0 to 220 (mean level) corresponds to
an additional sovereign bond holdings of around 5% (508bps) at the individual bank
level. This effect is economically meaningful and more than four times larger than
the average sovereign portion holding in my sample (120bps, see Table 2). In com-
parison, the size of that effect is close to 50% of the additional contribution of the
crisis to average home bias that was found previously (approximately, 1,100bps, see
Columns III/IV in Table 3). A similar back-of-the-envelope calculation with the esti-
mated coefficient of the mergers proxy in Column I generates an additional impact of
488bps for the median country and is comparable to the previous calculation with the
coefficient for bank branches. The resulting implication is that financial information
transmission matters and has sizeable effects both on banks’ domestic and foreign
government exposures.
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TABLE 5
Effect of Informational Distance on Sovereign Debt Reallocation
Dependent variable: SovereignPortion
Sample: All observations Foreign
[I] [II] [III] [IV]
Specification: Single variables Full specification Single variables Full specification
SovRisk × Branches 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.067*** 0.082***
[5.302] [2.916] [2.957] [2.852]
SovRisk × Mergers 0.677*** −0.336 1.649*** 0.449
[3.786] [−1.549] [2.716] [0.497]
SovRisk × Press 146.980*** −26.622 45.248** −57.320**
[4.176] [−0.996] [2.240] [−2.443]
SovRisk × Language 77.261*** 31.201** 34.284*** 40.052**
[6.340] [1.982] [3.519] [2.499]
SovRisk × Colony 68.186*** 1.671 28.298*** 7.885
[5.471] [0.165] [2.877] [0.709]
SovRisk × Distance −18.206*** −8.452* −11.388** −4.140
[−4.756] [−1.751] [−2.566] [−1.027]
SovRisk × Border 71.815*** 3.348 17.012* −26.230**
[4.553] [0.338] [1.876] [−2.430]
SovRisk × Legal 10.629*** 4.105 4.065 5.922*
[3.398] [1.260] [1.423] [1.898]
Fixed effects
Bank × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
ExpCountry × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
HomeCountry ×
ExpCountry
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank
Adj-R2 – 0.519 – 0.226
N 23,268 23,268 22,437 22,437
Note: The table summarizes the results of the equation (2) separately in full sample (Columns I–II) and in foreign sample (Columns III–IV)
estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. Each coefficient in Columns
I and III is obtained from a separate estimation whereas the ones in Columns II and IV are obtained from the same estimation. Dependent
variable is SovereignPortion, which measures the portion of total sovereign debt of a country held by a specific bank. SovRisk is a measure of
sovereign risk and calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding the observation date. For the specific
definitions and sources of information proxies (Branches-Legal), see the Data Description section. Sovereign bond holding data come from
various exercises of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and country exposures are included for 30 members of the European Economic
Area (EEA). Bond yields are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level and t-statistics are reported
in brackets. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01.
One could argue that branches or mergers may also pick up the general effect of
the governments’ moral suasion on banks since more branches/mergers may mean
more space for governments in corresponding countries to intervene and hence more
regulatory leverage to use against the banks. Even though such possibility cannot be
excluded in theoretical terms, one should expect that such pressures would naturally
be stronger on domestic banks as the vast literature on moral suasion suggests (Al-
tavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli 2017, Becker and Ivashina 2018, Ongena, Popov, and
Van Horen 2019). If so, one should observe a higher coefficient on the full sample
estimations (vis-à-vis foreign sample) for these two variables, which does not seem
to be the case. In fact, contrary to this prediction, coefficients found in the foreign
sample (Column III) are two to four times larger than their full-sample counterparts
which negates the possibility that these coefficients are influenced by moral suasion.
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A more general information proxy is the Press variable, which essentially captures
the newspaper coverage between banks’ home and exposure countries prior to the Eu-
rozone crisis. The separately estimated coefficients of the interactions for this proxy
are significant in both samples (Columns I and III), despite its size being smaller in
the foreign one. Hence, one could think of them as representing the lower and upper
bounds of the true effect of general information on sovereign exposures. In addition,
other more structural variables such as common language and geographical distance
also turn out to be highly significant in expected directions. To the extent that one
could think of these proxies as historically determined and thus exogenous, the evi-
dence here also points to the existence of a causal impact of information on sovereign
bond exposures.
When all of these interactions are estimated within the same specification
(Columns II and IV), the variables that have a dominant impact on sovereign ex-
posures seem to be Branches and Language. Interestingly, Press variable takes the
opposite sign possibly due to the biased nature of this variable as the media tends
to transmit the negative news more heavily and is likely to feed the previously held
stereotypes. In a similar fashion, Border variable switches signs in the foreign sample
(Column IV) whichmight be because, once the information channel is controlled, this
variable might capture investor incentives to diversify their portfolios toward distant
countries with less correlated business cycles.
To make sure that the estimations are not picking up some mechanical change due
to the composition of the banks in my sample from one EBA announcement to an-
other, I repeat the same analysis with several alternative dependent variables that try
to adjust for such potential bias. First, Table B2 contains the results with the CAPM-
adjusted SovereignPortionBias variable which corrects the previous dependent vari-
able by taking into account the size of each bank’s relative government bond portfolio.
Economic size and significance of these estimates are almost identical to the previous
ones in Table 5.
Second, instead of normalizing the dependent variable, I directly use the banks’
nominal exposures in a logarithmic form, à la Brutti and Sauré (2016). Results are
available in Table B3 and show that, if anything, statistical significance rises for most
coefficient estimates.
Finally, instead of dividing the banks’ nominal bond exposures with the total bank-
held debt of each country internally calculated withinmy sample at each point in time,
I create a new dependent variable (SovereignPortionECB) by dividing the same nom-
inal exposures by the total debt stock of each country as measured by the ECB at
the corresponding time-points. This expectedly constitutes a noisier measure as it is
more difficult to pin down the correct value of the country’s aggregate debt stock es-
pecially if some of it is issued in the form that cannot be traded in secondary markets.
Such a scale would be especially insensitive, and thus problematic, in periods when
the value of government debt fluctuates intensely, which is obviously the case during
my sample period. Nevertheless, despite its potential shortcomings, the results in Ta-
ble B4 with this new dependent variable do not seem to deviate too much from the
previous ones. Standard errors are expectedly higher and the point estimates seem to
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be smaller possibly due to the fact that nominal exposures are now scaled by total
debt stock rather than only by bank-held debt. What is more interesting is the fact
that the estimated coefficients for financial information (see Branches in Columns I
and III) are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5. Overall, the findings in this
subsection confirm the main prediction of the paper: government debt is reallocated
to the informationally closer banks as the default risk of the underlying debt goes up.
3.2.3 Robustness checks. In this subsection, I will be using an incremental strategy
where I incorporate the previous robustness checks as I move to the next one, reas-
suring the reader on the strength of my findings even when various restrictions are
imposed simultaneously rather than one at a time. All the related tables containing
the results of this subsection can be found in the Online Appendix.
One potentially confounding factor might be the possibility that the countries
struck by the Eurozone crisis may also be better connected to each other. In such
a case, information variables may capture the risk-shifting tendency of the foreign
banks located in other crisis countries (Crosignani 2015). To control for this possi-
bility, I include StressedBank × Crisis interaction as an additional control in equa-
tion (2). Here, StressedBank constitutes a dummy that takes the value of one if the
home country of the bank is experiencing a crisis (bond spreads > 400bps). A fur-
ther criticism might be due to Brutti and Sauré (2016) who argue that the political
strength of the bank’s home country might be important for sovereign debt reallo-
cation. Since the banks from politically-powerful countries may feel more confident
about enforcing repayments, they may tend to buy foreign government bonds while
others are selling. If large and politically strong Eurozone countries also have banking
systems closely connected to the troubled economies, then I might simply be captur-
ing this “political strength” effect rather than the information channel. To incorporate
this into my framework, I construct two additional control variables that Brutti and
Sauré (2016) propose as a measure of political strength. One is the share of total Eu-
rozone GDP that the home country of the bank produces, namely, EuroSharel ; and
the second is simply a dummy for the German banksGermanBankl . Table B5 updates
the results with these extra controls and confirms that none of the previous findings
regarding the information channel change in any meaningful way.17
One further extension could be to check whether previous results might be driven
by the heterogeneous exposure to exchange rate risk. Since my sample includes
some banks located in non-Eurozone countries such as HSBC in United Kingdom
or Danske Bank in Denmark, differences in these banks’ currency exposures may
affect their hedging strategies via government bonds. To account for this scenario, I
construct a subsample only composed of banks headquartered in the Eurozone coun-
tries. Hence, all the banks in this subsample use Euro as the main currency. Given
that full currency compositions of the bank balance sheets are unknown, I assume that
these banks should on average face similar exchange rate risks toward other countries.
Table B6 reports the corresponding estimates. As can be clearly seen, there is no
17. In an unreported robustness check, I also interact these home country variables with SovereignRisk
(i.e., bond spreads) instead of Crisis and confirm that the results are very similar.
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material change in any of my previous findings. If anything, most coefficient esti-
mates seem to be larger in this subsample.
Despite accounting for the differences in exchange rates, one can still argue that
there was substantial redenomination (break-up) risk within the Eurozone during the
recent crisis. As some countries may have started planning to get out of the mon-
etary union, banks may have optimally started selling government bonds to hedge
against such countries in order to avoid potential currency mismatches after a Eu-
rozone break-up. However, it is not straightforward to list which countries actually
planned to exit or which countries were perceived by the market as potentially prepar-
ing to exit. Thus, to test whether such motives are important in explaining my results,
I follow a strategy similar to Brutti and Sauré (2016) and drop from my sample all
the bank exposures toward Greece. It can be easily argued that, if any break-up ex-
pectations were evident during the sample period, this would be especially valid for
Greece as it has been the country that suffered the most from the Eurozone crisis
both economically and politically (Lane 2012). Therefore, Table B7 presents the re-
sults with Eurozone banks, but this time without any Greek exposures. Again, there
does not seem to be any significant change in the reported estimates, supporting the
notion that they are not substantially driven by the redenomination risk.
On top of the previous setting with the Eurozone banks and the exclusion of all ex-
posures to Greece, one can also think that possible moral suasion applied to the Greek
banks may have distorted their exposures not only to Greece but to other countries
as well. One possible way to check if this may have an impact on my results could
be to drop all the Greek banks in my sample with all of their exposures. Table B8 il-
lustrates the results with such further restriction on my sample. Coefficients on some
of the structural proxies such as language and colonial links are now less precisely
estimated (probably due to the loss of such relationships between Greek banks and
Cyprus in the new subsample) although their economic magnitudes are still similar
to the previous table. Most importantly, no significant change can be observed for
financial information proxies, which remain highly significant.
In spite of the overwhelming evidence from the previous subsample checks, one
could still suspect that themoral suasion or any other debt reallocation channel specif-
ically applicable to the Eurozone crisis may be driving my results. To minimize such
concerns and show that the information channel is more generalizable than being
specific to a crisis episode, I focus only on the observations from the postcrisis pe-
riod. As clear from the literature on the Eurozone crisis, Mario Draghi’s “whatever
it takes” speech in July 2012, and the ECB’s subsequent Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OMT) program have pulled the government debt markets from the brink of
a collapse and marked the end of the intense phase of the Eurozone crisis (Saka,
Fuertes, and Kalotychou 2015, Delatte, Fouquau, and Portes 2017). Therefore, in a
new subsample test, I focus only on the observations after July 2012. This gives me
five data time-points starting from the last quarter of 2012 (see Table 1), meaning
that my sample size is automatically reduced by almost half. Even with such a small
subsample, Table B9 shows that most proxies are still significant at conventional lev-
els and, compared to the Columns I and III in Table 5, almost all of them are larger
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except the proxy for legal origins that turns out negative in the foreign sample but
not significant. The fact that my estimates are larger in the second half of the sam-
ple period provides further reassurance that they are not driven substantially by other
crisis-specific channels, such as moral suasion, whose intensity would expectedly be
lower during the postcrisis period.
As an additional (as well as quite restrictive) check, I merge the conditions that led
to Tables B8 and B9; that is, I focus on the Eurozone banks in the postcrisis period
by also dropping any exposure to Greece or any exposure by a Greek bank while still
controlling for risk-shifting and the strength of the home country channels. Results
with this smallest and most restrictive subsample are provided in Table B10. Vis-à-
vis Table B8, coefficients are much less precisely estimated, which is not surprising
given that the sample size shrinks considerably in Table B10. On the other hand,
point estimates in general are not vastly different in terms of size. More importantly,
there is still some statistical evidence that financial information proxies or structural
factors such as geographical distance or common borders have an impact on banks’
government bond exposures.
As a final test, I experiment with different clustering schemes as I did in the previ-
ous section for Tables 3 and 4. I find that the reestimations of Table 5 with standard
errors clustered by home country (Table B11), time (Table B12), and home country
× time (Table B13) still provide conventional levels of statistical significance.
3.3 Discussion and Policy Implications
The findings in this section clearly challenge the existing literature on the rising
home bias in the Eurozone sovereign debt markets and provide evidence for a unique
channel that has not been studied in this context before. One might argue that, in the
age of technology and well-integrated markets such as the ones in Europe, informa-
tion must be cheap to attain; so huge asymmetries in the markets should not arise.
However, the theoretical literature illustrates that even initially-small differences in
the informational standings of domestic and foreign agents may lead them to focus
on these differences rather than spending effort to get the information related to for-
eign assets (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2009). This could be especially true in
times of crisis.
Such an argument aligns well with the recent work studying the Eurozone
sovereign spreads and providing evidence that, at the peak of the crisis, there were
great discrepancies between bond yields (or CDS spreads) and macro fundamentals
of the countries in the Euro periphery, which is interpreted as a sign of market panic
(De Grauwe and Ji 2013, Saka, Fuertes, and Kalotychou 2015). In such circum-
stances, it is not unreasonable to expect domestic or government-related banks to
benefit from their superior informational position and collect the government bonds
while foreign banks leave the markets in a rush. In fact, the recent research shows
that the banks that had loaded up periphery-country bonds during the crisis period
benefited from this strategy by making huge profits as the bond prices went up later
on (Acharya et al. 2019).
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What is then so special about domestic banks over other types of domestic agents?
First of all, domestic banks are the main players in the government debt markets.
Figure 3 clearly illustrates that even before the crisis in the Euro periphery, domes-
tic banks held almost as much sovereign debt as that of all other domestic agents
combined. This could give the banks a comparative edge in pricing of govern-
ment securities. Second, banks are natural information gatherers for their economies.
They transact with almost every sector of the domestic businesses and gain in-
advance information on how well the overall economy may perform over the coming
months/quarters, which would have a tremendous effect over government’s ability to
raise tax revenues and pay back its debt. Third, banks are the agents with the greatest
access to liquidity (via central banks) in times of financial crises. Hence, in a liquidity
crunch, governments may find it easier to signal their intentions/plans to local banks
than any other local agent. Last but not least, public ownership in the banking sector
is still more common relative to other sectors, which does not only give the govern-
ment a tool to pressure banks, but also opens the possible communication channels
that can transmit crucial soft information during times of sovereign stress (Ilzetzki
2014).
Eurozone crisis has been characterized by sudden changes in the periphery coun-
tries’ bond prices and various policy responses in the face of rising market specula-
tion. Especially the actions taken by the ECB may have been instrumental. For in-
stance, some may argue that the cheap financing provided by the ECB to commercial
banks in the form of long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) may have led some of
these banks to increase their exposures to risky government bonds in other countries.
However, since these operations were available for all the banks in the Eurozone, it
still does not explain the incentives of the banks that loaded up government bonds by
using these funds. In addition, the ECB itself has started buying sovereign bonds via
its Quantitative Easing (QE) program since early 2015, which may have distorted the
incentives of the commercial banks holding government bonds. However, as the sam-
ple period in my analysis (2010q1–2015q2) does not overlap with QE, the previous
argument cannot dilute the main message of this paper either.
As a key policy conclusion: if information channel gets activated between gov-
ernments and domestic banks in the midst of a crisis, this may be considered as a
stabilizing force compared to a situation where even domestic banks would rush out
of the market and governments would find it impossible to rollover their debt. There-
fore, the close link between governments and their domestic banks may create pos-
itive externalities in terms of mitigating the effects of sudden stops and preventing
the inefficient sovereign defaults. Nevertheless, policy discussions have so far em-
phasized shifting the regulatory power from national to supranational institutions to
avoid moral suasion or coming up with various innovations of debt issuance in order
to cut off the diabolic loop between sovereigns and their banks (see Brunnermeier
et al. 2016). Taken at face value, my results imply that these precautions would not
be sufficient to prevent the rising home bias problem (to the extent that it constitutes
a problem) during crises. Instead further policy discussions may also focus on in-
creasing transparency in the sovereign debt markets especially in times of crisis or
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encouraging more cross-border banking activities to improve the informational ties
across countries.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new channel of sovereign debt reallocation across banks
based on informational frictions and provides evidence in the context of the recent
Eurozone debt crisis. Using a novel bank-level data set, the paper first confirms that
the European banks’ home bias increased and sovereign debt was indeed reallocated
from foreign to domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Later, it illustrates that the
private forms of debt (retail and corporate) in the same bank balance-sheets have
experienced an equally large (if not larger) jump in home bias in response to the
same crisis, pointing toward a more general explanation of the home bias rather than
the specific ones applied to sovereign debt in the recent literature.
To identify the information channel, I primarily focus on the banks’ foreign coun-
try exposures, which helps me minimize the potentially confounding effects of the
alternative stories that are specific to the domestic exposures, such as moral suasion
or secondary market channels. While helping for identification, this strategy also as-
sumes that the workings of the informational channel do not vastly differ between
foreign and domestic exposures. This assumption seems plausible given the similar-
ity of my results across samples with and without domestic holdings.
Empirically, I take a difference-in-differences approach by comparing the
sovereign exposures of foreign banks at different levels of informational closeness
with varying levels of sovereign risk for the exposure country. In other words, I esti-
mate the interaction between various information proxies and sovereign bond spreads.
As a result, I find strong evidence for the argument that the foreign banks head-
quartered in informationally closer territories increase their relative exposures as the
sovereign risk rises. This effect is also found to be robust to controlling for various
alternative channels and changing sample compositions.
Hence, this paper contributes to the extant empirical literature on the role that in-
formational asymmetries play in asset markets and extends it to the context of govern-
ment bond exposures of commercial banks. An important implication is the possibil-
ity that the previous literature on the rising sovereign debt home bias in the Eurozone
may have been overestimating the role of alternative channels by simply compar-
ing domestic bank exposures to foreign ones in the absence of explicit controls for
informational distance.
The findings in the paper also have direct implications for policymakers. In the
absence of a national central bank acting as a lender of last resort, domestic banks in
the Eurozone may have mitigated the disrupting effects of a sudden stop triggered by
the less informed (and more panicky) foreign banks. Future policy discussions may
benefit from focusing on increasing the transparency in the sovereign debt market
and encouraging cross-border banking activities to mitigate the rising home bias in
advance of the next Eurozone crisis.
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